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Abstract
This paper derives the incidence of linear taxes on capital and labor in
a competitive equilibrium in balanced growth. The paper further consid-
ers a tax on consumption and a tax credit. Tax incidence is determined
using an analytic expression for the saving rate out of income net of all
taxes and credits. Results for zero population growth do not extend to
positive population growth, where the incidence of a tax on interest in-
come is positive and a tax on consumption reduces the interest rate.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper develops the implications of competitive equilibrium in an aggre-
gate economy for the incidence of linear taxes on capital and labor income.1
Consequences of a tax on consumption and a tax credit for saving are also con-
sidered. The paper shows that results generated by a steady state model with
zero population growth cannot be extended to positive population growth.
The results support arguments that a positive tax on interest income can
be incorporated into an optimal tax system. Andrew Abel (2007) has argued
t h a tc o m b i n i n gat a xo ni n t e r e s ti n c o m ew i t ha ne q u a lt a xc r e d i tf o rs a v i n g
can eﬃciently raise tax revenue. In the steady state case with zero population
growth, this paper also shows that setting the tax on interest income equal to
∗The author is indebted to Michael Jerison, John Bailey Jones, Joop Hartog, and Adrian
Masters for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are the responsibility of the author.
1Tax incidence analysis seeks to determine the burden of a tax from the change in the
price of an item or, in the context of factor markets, the change in the factor prices (e.g., wage
or interest rate). Standard references include Fullerton and Metcalf (2002), Keller (1980),
Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1987), Salanié (2003) and Sørensen (2004).
1the tax credit for saving and raising both will generate increased tax revenues
with no loss in production. If a tax credit is already in place, eliminating the
tax on interest income would be distortionary and ineﬃcient. This paper also
shows that recipients of interest income can be taxed at positive rates indirectly
using a tax on consumption.
The approach taken here diﬀers from the tax eﬃciency literature and reaches
diﬀerent conclusions. Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985) analyze taxes in the con-
text of models that reach steady state equilibrium. Following modern practice,
these models are based on optimal dynamic behavior of a ﬁxed population of
representative consumers. A major point of this paper is that these ﬁxed pop-
ulation models of a macroeconomy do not provide a valid basis for tax policy.
The methodology of this paper is to consider alternative balanced growth
equilibria of an economy generated by competitive equilibrium for alternative
parameter values. The competitive equilibrium of the economy is determined by
factor market equilibrium and goods market equilibrium. Factor market equi-
librium arises from the neoclassical property that factor prices (wages and the
interest rate in the model developed here) are determined by marginal produc-
tivities. Government tax revenues are used to provide transfers to individuals
rather than ﬁnancing a separate category of government goods. Goods market
equilibrium (demands for goods add up to production) therefore holds whenever
national saving (consisting of personal and government saving) equals national
investment (generated by the expansion of capital needed for balanced growth).
The major innovation in the methodology of this paper arises from the simple
form of the condition for goods market equilibrium, with an analytic expression
for the personal saving rate out of income net of all taxes and credits. In the
steady state case with zero population growth, goods market equilibrium re-
quires that the saving rate must be identically zero, leading immediately to one
set of results. With positive population growth and positive government debt,
goods market equilibrium implies that the saving rate will be positive, generat-
ing results that are qualitatively diﬀerent from the steady state conclusions. As
a consequence, the steady state results cannot be extended to the general case
with positive population growth.
Conditions equivalent to goods market equilibrium have been incorporated
into earlier analysis of taxation but the implications for tax eﬃciency and in-
cidence have not been completely elaborated. Feldstein (1974) imposed equi-
librium in capital markets in his analysis of the long-run incidence of a capital
income tax (see the discussion by Fullerton and Metcalf, 2002, p. 1833). Boad-
way (1979) also argued that the consequences of a capital income tax cannot be
completely characterized within a steady state model. Salanié (2003, p. 141)
extended the Kaldor model (1955-1956), which incorporates a condition on na-
tional saving and investment without government, to analyze consequences of
tax policies (see also Sattinger, 2005). Capital market equilibrium (implied
by goods market equilibrium) is also incorporated into overlapping generations
models with demographic growth, perhaps in the form of a production budget
constraint (Salanié, 2003, Section 6.2). In a computational paper that generates
an eﬃcient positive tax on capital income, Conesa, Kitao and Krueger (2009, p.
231, equation 14) incorporate a condition on equilibrium in the capital market.
They attribute the positive tax on capital income to the problem of taxing older
people more, in the absence of age-dependent taxes.
The next section develops the model that provides an analytic basis for
determining tax incidence. Section 3 then provides the results on tax incidence,
diﬀerentiating between the general case and the exceptional case when there is
no population growth. Section 4 considers tax credits for saving and relates
the results to Abel (2007). Section 5 presents general conclusions for optimal
income tax policy, involving both equity and eﬃciency considerations.
2 Model
2.1 Outline
The economy consists of the government, ﬁrms, and individuals. Perfectly com-
petitive ﬁrms combine labor and capital and produce homogeneous output deter-
mined by an aggregate neoclassical production function. Government imposes
linear taxes on capital and labor income and on consumption, allows tax cred-
its, expands national debt, and uses tax and debt expansion revenues to pay for
transfers and interest on the debt. The population of individuals expands at a
constant rate, and individuals with an instantaneously separable utility function
determine labor supply and saving optimally over time.
2.2 Production
Let Kt and Lt be the amounts of capital and labor in the economy in period
t. If there is no ambiguity, the subscript for the time period will be dropped.
Let f[K,L] be the amount of output in the economy using K and L, where
the production function f is a continuous function of the factors K and L and
is homogeneous of degree one with declining marginal products of capital and










where r is the rate of return on capital (interest rate) and w i st h ew a g er a t e
for labor. Since fK is homogeneous of degree zero, it is a function of the ratio
of capital to labor. Let κ = K/L. Under the assumption of declining marginal
products, fK will be a decreasing function of κ = K/L and fL will be an
increasing function. By the perfectly competitive assumptions, ﬁrms will not
earn economic proﬁts and all returns on capital will consist of interest payments
to owners of capital.
32.3 Government
The government imposes linear taxes at the rate of tr,t w, and tc on interest
(capital) income, on labor and transfer income and on consumption, respectively,
and gives a linear tax credit of ts on savings. In a given balanced growth
equilibrium, the tax rates are constant over time. Let Dit be national debt held
by individual i in period t, and assume the government pays the individual rDit
interest on that debt. Let Dt =
￿
Dit be aggregate national debt in period t,
and let St be aggregate individual savings. Assume the population is P[t] in
period t and grows at the rate ρ. The government expands the national debt at
the rate ρ in balanced growth. The government uses tax and debt expansion
revenues to provide transfers to individuals in the economy. Assume that an
individual’s transfer Ri does not change over time and that the average transfer
for all individuals does not change over time as the population grows. Let
Rt =
￿
Rit. Then Rt+1 =( 1+ρ)Rt. Alternatively, one could assume that the
government uses revenues for government goods and services. This alternative
would require working out how government goods and services are produced,
how they enter individual utility functions, and how the expenditure eventually
generates income for individuals. The assumption that government revenues are
used for transfers greatly simpliﬁes the model without changing any essential
properties of the model or the results. Taxes collected by the government in a
period are:
Tt = trr(Kt + Dt)+tw(wLt + Rt)+tcCt − tsSt (3)
where Ct is aggregate consumption in the economy.
With the government expanding national debt by the amount ρDt in a given
period to continue in balanced growth, the government budget constraint is:
Tt + ρDt = Rt + rDt (4)
where the left side is sources of funds and the right side is uses of funds.
2.4 Individuals
Individuals in the economy supply labor, own wealth in the form of capital and
government debt, and determine consumption levels in each period. Over time,
individuals enter the economy, accumulate wealth starting from zero, and live
forever. Utility functions are assumed to be time separable and identical for
each individual, but individuals diﬀer by wealth holdings and transfers. Let
Wi,t,L i,t and Ci,t be individual i’s wealth, labor supply and consumption in
period t. Let the individual’s utility function in period t be given by
Uit =( Cit)γ1(H − Lit)γ2,γ 1 > 0,γ 2 > 0,γ 1+γ2 < 1 (5)
where H is the total amount of time available for work and H−Li,t is individual
i’s leisure. Assume that γ1 and γ2 are positive and γ1+γ2 < 1. This utility
function allows endogenous determination of labor supply and, as shown below,
4aggregation of both consumption and labor supply.2 Savings can also be written
as the change in wealth:
Sit = Wit+1 − Wit (6)
The individual’s after tax income is
r(1 − tr)Wit +( 1− tw)(wLit + Ri) − tcCit + tsSit (7)
Now consider the individual’s optimal dynamic behavior. Let Vit[Wit] be
individual i’s value function at period t, where Wit is the state variable. Setting








(Cit)γ1(H − Lit)γ2 + βVit+1[Wit+1]
￿
(9)
where β is the individual’s discount factor (the same for all individuals). Con-
sumption can be written as income after taxes minus savings:
Cit = r(1−tr)Wit+(1−tw)(wLit+Ri)−tcCit+ts(Wit+1−Wit)−(Wit+1−Wit)
Solving this expression for Cit, consumption is a function of labor supply and




(r(1 − tr)Wit +( 1− tw)(wLit + Ri) − (1 − ts)(Wit+1 − Wit))
(10)
Since Vit[Wit+1] does not depend on Cit or Lit, the optimal labor supply in
each period can be found as a function of the control variable by maximizing













Substituting Cit from 10 yields the solution
Lit = H −
γ2((1− tw)(wH + Rit)+r(1 − tr)Wit − (1 − ts)(Wit+1 − Wit))
(γ1+γ2)w(1 − tw)
(12)
2The utility function incorporates the separability between consumption and leisure that
allows aggregation of consumption and labor. See Deaton, 1979, 1992, p. 37, Auerbach and
Hines, 2002, p. 1372, and Salanié, 2003, p. 124, for discussions of aggregation of individual
behavior. Note that if labor supply is exogenous, capital income taxation would be ineﬃcient
as a direct consequence of Henry George’s single tax principle.
5For positive levels of labor supply, the optimal dynamic solution satisﬁes two
conditions. The ﬁrst is that the control variable Wit+1 must maximize the right







The second is the Benveniste-Scheinkman condition obtained by diﬀerentiating







Applying this condition in the next period and substituting the result into 13







Using the expressions for utility, consumption and labor supply in 5, 10 and 12,
respectively, and rearranging yields the solvable form of the Euler equation:
1




(1 − tw)(wH + Ri)+( 1− tr)rWit+1 − (1 − ts)(Wit+2 − Wit+1)












The solution can be found by expressing the condition that income net of income
taxes grows by a factor η each period:
(1 − tw)(wH + Ri)+r(1 − tr)Wit+1 = η((1 − tw)(wH + Ri)+r(1 − tr)Wit)
Rearranging and solving yields:
Wit+1 − Wit =
η − 1
r(1 − tr)
((1 − tw)(wH + Ri)+r(1 − tr)Wit) (18)
so that (1−tw)(wH +Ri)+(1−tr)rWit −(1−ts)(Wit+1 −Wit) also grows by
the constant factor η in each period.
With this solution, it is possible to work out the pattern of saving, wealth
accumulation and labor supply over time for an individual. For reasonable
parameter values, the individual accumulates wealth and eventually labor supply
6goes to zero. Since most individuals in the economy will have positive labor
supply, the solution in 18 will be used to characterize individual behavior.3
These results can now be used to obtain aggregate expressions for the econ-
omy’s labor supply and private savings. Substituting savings from the right
hand side of 18 into 12 yields
Lit = H − (19)
γ2(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))((1 − tw)(wH + Ri)+r(1 − tr)Wit)
(γ1+γ2)r(1 − tr)w(1 − tw)
Summing over all individuals yields
Lt =
￿
i Lit = HP[t] − (20)
γ2(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))((1 − tw)(wHP[t]+Rt)+r(1 − tr)Wt)
(γ1+γ2)r(1 − tr)w(1 − tw)
Following the same steps, aggregate consumption can be expressed as:
Ct =
γ1(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))((1 − tw)(wHP[t]+Rt)+r(1 − tr)Wt)
(γ1+γ2)(1 + tc)(1 − tr)
(21)
2.5 General Equilibrium
General equilibrium in the model considered here is determined by competitive
equilibrium with optimizing agents, given the tax, transfer and debt policies of
the government. For expositional purposes, the competitive equilibrium condi-
tions are divided into a factor market equilibrium condition and a goods market
equilibrium condition. The factor market equilibrium condition arises from the
neoclassical result that factor prices equal factors’ marginal products when fac-
tor markets are competitive. Since the production function is homogeneous of
degree one, the derivatives are homogeneous of degree zero so that
r = f1(K,L)=f1(κ,1) (22)
When this condition holds, the wage rate w will also equal its marginal product
f2(κ,1). The conditions for factor market equilibrium therefore reduce to a
single inverse relation between the interest rate r and the capital to labor ratio
κ = K/L.
Goods market equilibrium arises when the demand for goods (individual
consumption plus ﬁrm investment) equals production. In the context of the
3For the parameters used in Figure 1 below, labor supply goes to zero after 200 periods,
1.9 percent of the population supplies zero labor, and they own 10.9 percent of the wealth.
The present discounted value of individual wealth in year n approaches zero as n increases
indeﬁnitely whenever (β(1+r(1−tr))γ1)1/(1−γ1) < 1, satisfying the transversality condition.
7model developed here, this occurs when individual consumption equals produc-
tion minus investment, given by the expansion of capital needed for balanced
growth (with a constant interest rate):
Ct = f[Kt,L t] − ρKt. (23)
Deﬁnition 1 Balanced growth equilibrium arises when ﬁrms maximize proﬁts,
satisfying the condition for factor market equilibrium in 1, individuals maximize
utility in 5 over time and satisfy the Euler equation in 16 and optimal labor sup-
ply in 12, the government satisﬁes its budget constraint in 4, and the condition
for goods market equilibrium in 23 is satisﬁed, with these conditions continuing
to hold indeﬁnitely with a constant population growth rate ρ.
Let NSI be national savings (personal savings plus government savings)
m i n u sn a t i o n a li n v e s t m e n tp e ru n i to fl a b o r :
NSI = s(f[κ,1] + ρD/L) − ρD/L − ρκ (24)
Theorem 2 In a balanced growth equilibrium, i. aggregate personal savings in
ap e r i o da r e
St = s(f(Kt,L t)+ρDt) (25)
where s, the saving rate out of income net of all taxes and credits, is given by
s =
(γ1+γ2)(1 + tc)(η − 1)
(γ1+γ2)(1 + tc)(η − 1) + γ1(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))
(26)
ii. the goods market is in equilibrium when
NSI =0 (27)
Proof. i. First consider the saving rate s. From 18, aggregating personal savings
over all individuals yields
η − 1
r(1 − tr)
((1 − tw)(wHP[t]+Rt)+r(1 − tr)(Kt + Dt)) (28)
where aggregate wealth is given by capital plus national debt, Kt+Dt. Aggregate
income net of all taxes and credits in a period is
(1 − tw)(wLt + Rt)+r(1 − tr)(Kt + Dt) − tcCt + tsSt (29)
Substituting aggregate consumption from 21, aggregate labor from 20, and ag-
gregate savings from 28, aggregate income net of all taxes and credits simpliﬁes
to
(γ1+γ2)(1 + tc)(η − 1) + γ1(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))
(γ1+γ2)r(1 − tr)(1 + tc)
(30)
times
((1 − tw)(wHP[t]+Rt)+r(1 − tr)(Kt + Dt)) (31)
8Note that the factor (1−tw)(wHP[t]+Rt)+r(1−tr)(Kt+Dt) appears in both
aggregate personal savings and income net of all taxes and credits. Then the
saving rate s in 26 can be derived as the ratio of aggregate personal savings to
income net of all taxes and credits. Next, income net of all taxes and credits can
be constructed as the economy’s output plus transfers plus interest on the debt
minus net taxes, or f(Kt,L t)+Rt + rDt − Tt. From the government’s budget
constraint in 4, Rt − Tt =( ρ − r)Dt. Aggregate personal savings can then be
expressed as:
St = s((1 − tw)(wLt + Rt)+r(1 − tr)(Kt + Dt) − tcCt + tsSt)
= s(wLt + rKt + Rt + rDt − Tt)
= s(f(Kt,L t)+Rt + rDt − Tt)
= s(f(Kt,L t)+ρDt) (32)
ii. Goods market equilibrium occurs when 23 holds. The amount individuals
choose to spend on consumption is given by income net of all taxes and credits
(essentially disposable income) minus saving:
Ct = f[Kt,L t]+Rt + rDt − Tt − St
= f[Kt,L t]+ρDt − St
=( 1 − s)(f[KtLt]+ρDt) (33)
Setting (1−s)(f[KtLt]+ρDt) equal to f[Kt,L t]−ρKt, rearranging and dividing
by Lt (and dropping time subscripts) yields NSI = s(f[κ,1]+ρD/L)−ρD/L−
ρκ =0 .
The division of competitive equilibrium conditions into factor market and
goods market equilibrium facilitates the representation of the equilibrium solu-
tion (given by r and κ) as the intersection between two relations. Factor market
equilibrium (hereafter FME) in 22 determines a downward sloping relation be-
tween r and κ (with r on the vertical axis and κ on the horizontal axis). The
condition NSI =0implied by goods market equilibrium determines a second
relation between r and κ. The FME relation does not depend on any govern-
ment tax or debt parameters and is unaﬀected by any changes. Tax incidence
can then be studied by examining how the relation determined by goods market
equilibrium (hereafter GME) shifts when parameters change. The slope of the
GME relation can be determined as follows.
The slope of this relation (with r on the vertical axis) depends on the eﬀects
of r and κ on NSI. Consider ﬁrst the eﬀect of the interest rate. The eﬀect
depends only on what happens to the saving rate s in 26 since r does not
appear elsewhere in NSI. From 26, the saving rate depends on r(1−tr)/(η−1),
where η is also a function of the interest rate net of taxes. Using a standard
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r(1 − tr)/(1 − ts)
(35)
In this expression, β<1 so 1 − β
1/(1−γ1−γ2) > 0. Thus an increase in r(1 − tr)
raises (η−1)/r(1−tr), lowers r(1−tr)/(η−1) and increases the saving rate as
expected.4 It follows that an increase in r, holding tr ﬁxed, will also increase s
and NSI. Next, consider how κ aﬀects NSI.
Theorem 3 An increase in κ, holding r and other variables constant, reduces
NSI whenever
w>(r − ρ)D/L (36)







This derivative will be negative whenever
∂f[κ,1]
∂κ
− ρ/s = f1[κ,1] − ρ/s < 0
Applying the condition for GME in 27, the ﬁrst order conditions 1 and 2, and
Euler’s law,




−(f[κ,1] − κf1[κ,1]) + (f1[κ,1] − ρ)D/L
κ + D/L
=
−w +( r − ρ)D/L
κ + D/L
Then ∂NSI/∂κ < 0 whenever w>(r − ρ)D/L. This argument does not hold
if ρ =0 . Then GME requires that s =0 , so that the ratio ρ/s would be








4Adding n additional terms for the series expansion for (1+r(1−tr)/(1−ts))1/(1−γ1−γ2)
does not change the results as long as 1/(1 − γ1 − γ2) − n is positive.











Figure 1: Conditions for Competitive Equilibrium
Then an increase in κ reduces NSI whenever w>r D / L ,so that Theorem 3
remains valid for the case ρ =0 .
To summarize, an increase in r raises NSI (given the approximation in 35)
while an increase in κ reduces NSI. For GME to continue to hold, an increase
in κ m u s tb ea c c o m p a n i e db ya ni n c r e a s ei nr. In a graph with r on the vertical
axis and the capital to labor ratio κ on the horizontal axis, the GME will be
upward sloping.
Figure 1 shows the curves for the two conditions and the intersection where
balanced growth equilibrium occurs.5
Analysis proceeds by determining how a parameter shifts the GME.I n
Figure 1, NSI is positive to the left of the FME and negative to the right. If
a change in a parameter causes NSI to be positive at the former combination
of r and κ, then κ must be higher to reduce NSI to zero at the same interest
rate, i.e. the GME shifts to the right. Similarly, if a parameter change reduces
NSI below zero, the GME shifts to the left.
The intersection of FME and GME determines the interest rate and the
capital to labor ratio but not the labor supply. When considering shifts in
the GME in response to alternative parameter values, it is also informative to
consider how labor supply changes. The expression for aggregate labor supply
in 20 determines labor supply implicitly since aggregate wealth depends on the
5The assumptions for the ﬁgure are that f(K,L)=K1−aLa, with a = .67,t w = .3,t r = .2,
tc = .1,t s =0 ,ρ= .02,β= .96,γ 1 = γ2 = .3,D / L=3 , and H =1 2 .
11labor supply (holding D/L constant):
Wt = Kt + Dt =( Kt/Lt + Dt/Lt)Lt =( κ + D/L)Lt (37)
In the analysis that follows, the ratio of debt to labor supply, D/L, will be
treated as a policy variable that will remain constant when considering eﬀects
of changes in tax rates. Substituting this expression for Wt into 20 and solving
for Lt yields
Lt =
(γ1+γ2)wHP[t] − γ2(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts))
Rt+wHP[t]
r(1−tr)




Next, solving for Rt,T t,C t and Lt simultaneously, an expression for Rt in terms
of the tax rates can be substituted for Rt, so that the eﬀects of changes on Lt
can be determined. In the resulting expression for aggregate labor supply, it
is necessary to determine the sign of the term r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts). The
sign can be found from the condition that the saving rate, if positive, will be
less than one (otherwise it can be shown that consumption would be negative
and investment would exceed production). Setting s<1 in 26 and simplifying
yields
r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts) > 0 (39)
As a consequence, the partial derivatives of labor supply with respect to tr,w
and η are positive, and the partial derivatives with respect to tw,t c,t s,κ ,D / L
and r are negative. For some combinations of changes, it is then possible to
determine the eﬀects on labor supply.
3 Tax Incidence
Tax incidence will be determined by comparing balanced growth equilibria under
alternative parameter values. This diﬀers from standard comparative statics
analysis in that the economy does not move from one equilibrium to another in
any speciﬁed amount of time. In making comparisons, it will be assumed that
the ratio of debt to labor supply, D/L, remains the same. (Alternatively, it is
possible to examine what happens when debt remains constant, so that D/L
would decline if L increases.) The analysis is simpliﬁed because the tax rates on
capital income and consumption and the interest rate only enter the saving rate
s, and the capital to labor ratio, ratio of debt to labor, and population growth
rate ρ only enter the remaining terms.
First, consider the steady state case of zero growth.
Theorem 4 Assume that the growth rate ρ is zero in a balanced growth equi-
librium and D/L is the same for alternative tax rates.
i. The incidence of a tax on interest income is zero.
ii. The incidence of a tax on labor or transfer income is 100%.
12iii. An increase in the tax on consumption lowers the after-tax purchasing
power of interest income and labor and transfer income but does not change the
wage or interest rate or the capital to labor ratio.
iv. An increase in D/L has no eﬀect on the interest rate, wage rate, or
capital to labor ratio.
Proof. i. Since ρ =0 , t h es a v i n gr a t ei n2 5m u s tb ez e r ot os a t i s f yt h eGME.
Then from 26, η =1or
r(1 − tr)=( 1− ts)(1 − β)/β (40)
For any given tax credit ts, the right hand side is ﬁxed and any increase in tr
raises r suﬃciently that r(1 − tr), the after tax return on wealth, remains the
same. Then the tax incidence is zero.
ii. If the tax rate tw on labor or transfer income increases, the saving rate
must remain zero so 40 continues to hold. Then the capital to labor ratio is
unaﬀected since r remains the same, and the wage rate also stays the same.
Labor and transfer income recipients pay the entire tax.
iii. Since 40 will also continue to hold when tc increases, the tax has no eﬀect
on the wage rate, interest rate, or capital to labor ratio.
iv. With ρ =0 , t h en a t i o n a ld e b td o e sn o ta p p e a ri nt h eGME and has no
eﬀect on w, r, or the capital to labor ratio. National debt reduces government
revenues since there are no revenues from expanding the debt.
In a steady state economy, only one saving rate and one after tax interest
rate can arise. While a tax on interest income can raise the interest rate and
reduce the capital to labor ratio, no other tax or debt policy can alter factor
payments or the capital to labor ratio. This accounts for the simplicity of the
results in Theorem 4. Now consider how the results diﬀer when population
growth is positive.
Theorem 5 Assume that the growth rate ρ is positive in a balanced growth
equilibrium, and D/L is the same for alternative tax rates. Then:
i. An increase in the tax rate on interest income tr will have a positive
incidence on interest recipients. The interest rate will be higher and the wage
rate lower. For a given shift in the GME, the incidence of the tax on interest
income recipients will be greater when the FME and GME are steeper.
ii. An increase in the tax rate on labor and transfer income, tw, leaves the
capital to labor ratio, the interest rate and the wage rate unaﬀected but reduces
the labor supply. The tax therefore falls completely on recipients of labor and
transfer income.
iii. An increase in the tax on consumption, tc, raises the saving rate, shifting
the GME to the right and generating a lower interest rate and higher wage rate.
iv. An increase in the level of national debt per worker, D/L, shifts the
GME leftward, generating a lower capital to labor ratio, a higher interest rate
and a lower wage rate. As a tax, national debt falls more heavily on workers.
Proof. i. Suppose r0 and κ0 are the interest rate and capital to labor ratio in
the balanced growth equilibrium before tr increases by  tr. At κ0, the interest
13rate at which GME holds after the tax increase (determined by the interest
rate such that the saving rate s i st h es a m ea tκ0) is r0 + r0 tr (that is, the
GME shifts up by r0 tr). At that interest rate, (1 − tr)r would be the same
after the tax increase as before. However, at the original interest rate r0,t h e
increase in tr reduces the saving rate, generating a decline in NSI, and shifting
the GME leftward. At the new equilibrium intersection of FME and GME,
the capital to labor ratio κ will be lower and the increase in the interest rate
(from r0) will be less than r0 + r0 tr.T h e n(1 − (tr +  tr))r<(1 − tr)r0 =
r0 + r0 tr − (tr + tr)r0 so that the incidence of the increase in tr on interest
income is positive. At the lower capital to labor ratio, wage rates will be lower.
For a given shift in the GME, the intersection of the FME and GME will
occur at a higher interest rate when they are steeper.
ii. The tax rate tw does not appear in the expression for the saving rate,
which stays the same for a given value of the interest rate. Since tw does not
enter elsewhere in the GME, the condition does not shift, and the solution for
the capital to labor ratio stays the same. However, the labor supply declines
because of the lower after tax wage, and output declines. At the same capital
to labor ratio, the wage rate and interest rate stay the same, and the tax on
labor and transfers falls completely on recipients.
iii. The tax on consumption, tc, enters the saving rate but not the rest
of the GME. Using 39, diﬀerentiation shows that an increase in tc raises the
saving rate s. With a higher saving rate, the GME shifts rightward, generating
a higher capital to labor ratio, a lower interest rate and a higher wage rate. The
tax on consumption falls more heavily on recipients of interest income, since the
interest rate is lower and recipients must also pay the higher consumption tax.
iv. National debt does not enter the saving rate, so the derivative of NSI
with respect to national debt per worker is −(1−s)ρ<0. Then the GME shifts
to the left, generating a lower capital to labor ratio, a higher interest rate and a
lower wage rate. National debt therefore raises the interest rate and lowers the
wage rate.
Only one result carries over from the steady state case in Theorem 4 to the
general case with positive population growth in Theorem 5: the tax on labor and
transfer income, tw, has no eﬀect on r, w or κ. Otherwise, the results of Theorem
4 provide no indication of the results in the general case. The conclusion in
Theorem 5, part i, that the incidence of a tax on interest income is positive
conﬂicts with the conventional wisdom. Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009,
p. 167) argue that the incidence of a tax on interest income is zero, without
limiting the result to the special case of zero population growth.
The conclusion that the tax on consumption raises κ and reduces r conﬂicts
with expectations derived from zero population growth models. Consumption
taxation as an alternative to capital income taxation has been discussed by
Zodrow (2007) and Salanié (2003, Chapter 9). With ρ =0 , a change in tc
does not aﬀect an individual’s intertemporal choice of consumption levels and
should therefore have no eﬀect on savings or the interest rate. However, the
mechanism through which tc aﬀects balanced growth equilibrium is not through
individual intertemporal choices, as it would be when ρ =0 , but through goods
14market equilibrium. Since tc enters the saving rate s in 26, savings go up when
tc increases. More directly, aggregate personal saving in 28 increases because
aggregate transfers, Rt depend positively on tc. Then an increase in tc shifts
GME rightward as described in the proof. The positive eﬀect of tc on the capital
to labor ratio demonstrates the limitations of conclusions based on steady state
or representative agent models.
The result that the level of debt per worker aﬀects the interest rate when
population growth is positive conﬂicts with conclusions generated from zero
population growth. Debt levels have no eﬀect on the interest rate with zero
population growth because, with no expansion in debt, the GME is unaﬀected.
In contrast, when ρ>0, g r e a t e rd e b tr e q u i r e sh i g h e rp e r s o n a ls a v i n ga n da
higher interest rate, so that debt is not neutral (P. Weil, 1987).
Another major diﬀerence arising from positive population growth is that tax
parameters aﬀect the pattern of wealth accumulation, income and consumption
over individual lifetimes. In contrast, with ρ =0 , the growth rate of wealth,
income and consumption are invariant to parameter changes. When ρ>0,
an increase in tr reduces (1 − tr)r and the rate of accumulation of individual
wealth, given by η in 17. Individuals experience higher income when younger
(from higher transfer incomes) but achieve lower growth rates of income and
consumption and therefore lower incomes and consumption when older. An
increase in tc, by shifting GME to the right, lowers the interest rate and thereby
reduces η. As a result, individuals face higher incomes and consumption levels
when young and lower incomes and consumption levels when older. An increase
in debt per worker has the opposite eﬀect, raising the interest rate and the rate
of individual wealth accumulation.
In the balanced growth model with positive population growth developed
here, changes in parameter values have signiﬁcant distributional consequences.
In contrast, models based on representative agents or a ﬁxed population can
only have very limited distributional consequences, perhaps encouraging policy
makers to disregard distributional consequences in evaluating alternative tax
policies. With positive population growth, both eﬃciency and distribution must
be considered. The following table summarizes the distributional consequences
when ρ>0.
Table 1: Distributional Consequences with ρ>0





An advantage of analyzing distributional consequences of alternative tax
policies is that the results lead to formation of combinations of policies that
would have minimal distributional eﬀects on the economy. The following theo-
rem, which only arises with positive population growth, describes one possible
combination.
Theorem 6 Assume that the growth rate ρ is positive in a balanced growth
15equilibrium and D/L is the same for alternative tax rates. Then there exists
a combination of increases in tax rates on interest income and consumption
that leaves the ratio of capital to labor, the saving rate s, the wage rate and the
interest rate unchanged.
Proof. B yT h e o r e m5 ,p a r ti ,a ni n c r e a s ei ntr reduces the capital to labor ratio
while by part iii, an increase in tc increases the capital to labor ratio. Then there
exists a combination of positive increases in tr and tc that leaves the capital to
labor ratio unchanged. Since the capital to labor ratio would be the same after
the tax increases, the marginal products of capital and labor would be the same
(from 1 and 2) and the interest rate and wage rate would be unchanged. From
the GME, s must remain the same since neither κ nor D/L change.
The incidence of the tax combination on interest rate recipients would be
positive both because tr rises and because they will pay more consumption taxes.
The combination would indirectly fall on labor income recipients through their
increased payment of consumption taxes. Transfer recipients would receive a
net increase from the increased level of tax payments. It can be shown that η
and the accumulation rate of personal assets would decline. The combination
o fg r e a t e rt r a n s f e rp a y m e n t sa n dl o w e rr a t e so fa s s e ta c c u m u l a t i o nw o u l da l t e r
patterns of income over lifetimes by increasing income at younger ages and
reducing incomes at older ages.
This theorem suggests that it may be possible to ﬁnd combinations of changes
in tax policies that generate more tax revenues while causing no additional dis-
tortions in the economy. In the case that generates Figure 1, an increase in the
tax on interest income from .2 to .202 could be combined with an increase in
the tax on consumption from .1 to .219 to yield a solution with the same inter-
est and wage rate and the same capital to labor ratio. However, labor supply
would decline from 3.92 to 3.66, with consequent reductions in production and
consumption and increases in tax revenue and transfers. By reducing the tax on
labor from .3 to .224, labor supply can be returned to its former level with no
net change in wage rate, interest rate, production or consumption, but with a
decline in η and an increase in taxes and transfers. This example demonstrates
that equally eﬃcient tax combinations (in terms of production) can be found
that have substantially diﬀerent distributional consequences.
4 Tax Credits
Andrew Abel (2007) has argued that a constant tax rate on capital income
is non-distortionary when producers can deduct capital purchases from capital
income taxes.6 This result appears to conﬂict with previous results by Chamley
(1986) and Judd (1985) that eﬃciency requires tr =0 . Abel’s analysis is set
in the context of corporate investment decisions and speciﬁes in more detail
corporate tax policies including depreciation. With diﬀerent assumptions, the
model developed here generates diﬀerences in the eﬃciency conclusions when
6Abel cites as predecessors Hall and Jorgenson (1971), Lucas (1990) and Samuelson (1964).
16population growth is positive. Nevertheless, the results are fundamentally in
agreement that taxation of capital income can be incorporated into optimal tax
policy.
There are several diﬀerences between the results for tax credits discussed
here and Abel’s development. In Abel’s model, the tax credit goes to new pur-
chasers of capital instead of savers, but the question of who receives the credit
has no consequences for tax incidence. The tax credit in Abel’s model is limited
to capital purchases while the tax credit considered here applies to all saving,
including acquisition of government debt. However, the return on government
debt is determined by the return on purchases of real assets, r(1 −tr)/(1 −ts).
If the government yields a tax credit on savings used to purchase government
assets diﬀerent from ts (including no tax credit), there will be a compensating
diﬀerential in the interest rate such that the consumer is indiﬀerent and the gov-
ernment budget is unaﬀected. There are other diﬀerences between the models
(including technological change, which would cause positive investment at zero
population growth, and depreciation) but these are not germane.
Although seemingly contradictory, Abel’s results are consistent with Cham-
ley and Judd because diﬀerent combinations of taxes and credits can have the
same consequences. Speciﬁcally, consider a uniform tax on all incomes and an
equal tax credit rate, with tr = tw = ts = tu and tc =0 . This combination
has exactly the same consequences as a consumption tax with tc = tu/(1 − tu)
and tr = tw = ts =0(of course there could be practical diﬀerences in the
administration of these diﬀerent combinations of taxes).7 This equivalence can
be established by comparing the outcomes for the two systems (including η, the
saving rate s, GME and labor supply). The ﬁrst combination, with positive
taxation of interest income, generates the same outcomes as the second combi-
nation, with zero capital taxation, and raises the same tax revenues, consistent
with Abel’s results.
As in the tax incidence results in the previous section, Abel’s results depend
on whether population growth is positive. The following theorem reproduces
Abel’s results using the model developed here in the case where ρ =0 .
Theorem 7 Suppose ρ =0in the balanced growth equilibrium and suppose
tr = ts = tu. At a higher tax rate tu,
i. The growth factor η remains unaﬀected at η =1and the saving rate s
remains unaﬀected at s =0 .
ii. The interest rate is unaﬀected at r =( 1− β)/β
iii. The wage rate w and the capital to labor ratio κ are unaﬀected.
iv. The labor supply is unaﬀected.
v. Tax revenues net of credits rise with no loss in production.
Proof. i. As in Theorem 4, η =1and s =0when ρ =0 . ii. From 40, with
tr = ts,r=( 1− β)/β. iii. Since the GME does not shift, k, w and r stay
the same. iv. In the expression for labor supply in 38, after substituting the
7Salanié, 2003, p. 188, discusses equivalent tax combinations. Abel (2007, p. 24) proposes
combining a tax on consumption with a subsidy of labor income to generate a tax on leisure.
17solution for transfers in terms of tax parameters, tr and ts cancel out so labor
supply stays the same. v. With the labor supply and the capital to labor ratio
unchanged, production stays the same. Since aggregate saving is zero, aggregate
tax credits do not rise when ts goes up, but tax revenues go up from a higher
tr.
Since there are no savings in the absence of population growth, one may
expect that ts would have no eﬀect. However, the tax credit aﬀects marginal
saving and investment and lowers the interest rate. Now consider how positive
population growth aﬀects the results with tax credits.
Theorem 8 Suppose ρ>0 in the balanced growth model and suppose tr = ts =
tu. At a higher tax rate tu,
i. The growth factor η w i l ls t a yt h es a m ea n dt h es a v i n gr a t es will in-
crease.
ii. The GME shifts to the right, raising κ and w and lowering r.
Proof. i. By inspection, η stays the same since 1−tr and 1−ts cancel out. In
26, the terms γ1(r(1 − tr) − (η − 1)(1 − ts)) decrease proportionately to 1 − tu
as tu increases, raising s.
i i . T h ei n c r e a s ei ns raises NSI above zero at the former interest rate,
shifting the GME rightward. The balanced growth equilibrium with tr = ts =
tu higher will have a lower r, higher w and higher κ.
When ρ>0, setting ts = tr > 0 does not return the economy to the same
solution as with zero taxes, as in Abel’s model, because of the increase in the
capital to labor ratio. Using the expression for aggregate labor supply in terms
of parameters, an increase in tr and ts,w i t htr = ts, raises labor supply. Since
κ also increases, capital and production are higher. The essential diﬀerence in
the models is that Abel bases his conclusions on the absence of changes in the
First Order Conditions for an individual’s dynamic optimization problem. He
a r g u e st h a tt h eF O C ’ sa r et h es a m ea sa ne ﬃ c i e n ts o l u t i o n(with only lump-sum
taxes) when there is a tax on capital income combined with a tax credit on new
investments. Under the restriction to the case where ρ =0 , this result holds
for the model developed in this section. Then η i st h es a m ea n dt h eF O C ’ s
for the individual’s dynamic optimization problem are the same whether or not
tr = ts = tu are positive or zero. Although this result does not carry over
to the case with positive population growth, as demonstrated in the previous
theorem, the changes generate an increase in labor supply instead of a decrease
that would reduce production.
Consider the eﬀects of changing ts by itself, holding other tax rates un-
changed. An increase in ts raises η at any given interest rate and raises (η −
1)(1 − ts) if the approximation in 35 holds. Then s increases, so that NSI is
positive at the previous combination of r and κ. An increase in ts essentially
shifts the GME down, just as an increase in tr would shift it up. The increase
in ts then raises κ, lowers r and raises w.
Despite the conclusion that taxation of interest income combined with tax
credits will in general be distortionary to some extent when ρ>0, Abel’s results
18are fundamentally correct regarding how to carry out taxation of interest income
recipients. Either of the two equivalent policies (uniform income tax with a
tax credit or indirect taxation based on consumption) can raise substantial tax
revenues while causing less redistribution of tax burdens to labor and transfer
recipients. Furthermore, if tax credits are already in place in an economy, a
policy to reduce taxation of interest income to zero could itself be distortionary.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper develops a model of the competitive general equilibrium of an econ-
omy in balanced growth to determine income tax incidence. The paper shows
that the results for zero population growth, which have been the basis for pre-
vious results on tax incidence and eﬃciency, do not extend to the general case
with positive population growth. Speciﬁcally, conventional wisdom asserts that
the incidence of a tax on interest income is zero. In contrast, when population
growth is positive, the incidence of the tax is positive. Also, the conventional
wisdom is that a tax on consumption cannot change saving because the in-
tertemporal consumption decision is unaﬀected. While this result is valid for
zero population growth, it no longer holds when population growth is positive.
A major tenet of the conventional wisdom is that the tax rate on interest
income should be zero for eﬃciency reasons.8 There is no valid basis for this
conclusion. The problem is not so much that the conclusion is derived from
steady state equilibrium without population growth, but that it focuses on the
taxation of interest income in isolation rather than in combination with other
tax policies. If the tax credit for saving is zero, then the eﬃcient tax rate on
interest income would be zero, as established in the eﬃciency literature for the
steady state case. As Abel (2007) has shown, a positive tax on interest income
can be combined with a tax credit for saving without aﬀecting the interest rate
or capital to labor ratio. Then if the tax credit is positive, reducing the tax
rate on interest income to zero would be ineﬃcient and distortionary. In the
steady state case, setting the tax on interest income equal to the tax credit for
saving and raising both would raise tax revenue without aﬀecting production.
With no production losses, it would be ineﬃcient to tax anything else. Only
consideration of equity and compassion for impoverished rentiers would prevent
tax authorities from deriving all tax revenue from interest income.
In the model developed here, with positive population growth, individuals
enter the economy and remain indeﬁnitely, saving over the course of their life-
times. It is possible to construct models with birth, death and overlapping
generations that reproduce the results of an economy in steady state equilib-
rium with no population growth. However, if endogenous bequests are included,
the results will diﬀer. Overlapping generations models require a diﬀerent analy-
sis that will be developed in future work. In that context, the analysis would
8Mankiw, Weinzierl and Yagan (2009, p. 167), in their review of optimal taxation, label
Lesson 7 as "Capital Income Ought To Be Untaxed, At Least in Expectation." They further
comment that ". . . its strong underlying logic has made it the benchmark."
19involve estate and pension taxes as well as tax deferrals.
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